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Abstract We prove the existence of a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
in nice games with isotone chain-concave best replies and compact strategy sets.
We establish a preliminary xpoint uniqueness argument, thus showing su¢ cient
assumptions on the best replies of a nice game that guarantee the existence of
exactly one Nash equilibrium. Then, by means of a comparative statics analysis,
we examine the necessity and su¢ ciency of the conditions on marginal utility
functions for such assumptions to be satised; in particular, we nd necessary
and su¢ cient conditions for the isotonicity and chain-concavity of best replies.
We extend the results on Nash equilibrium uniqueness to nice games with upper
unbounded strategy sets and we present dual results for games with isotone
chain-convex best replies. A nal application to Bayesian games is exhibited.
Keywords Nash equilibrium uniqueness; Chain-concave best reply; Nice
game; Comparative statics; Strategic complementarity.
JEL classi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1 Introduction
Nash equilibrium uniqueness has been a point of interest since the inception of
non-cooperative game theory. In his Ph.D. dissertation (see [25]), John Forbes
Nash posed the following rhetorical question about a possible interpretation of
the solution concept that took name after him:
What would be a rational prediction of the behavior to be ex-
pected of rational playing the game in question?
He answered that (Nash) equilibrium uniqueness, together with other con-
ditions of epistemic nature, are su¢ cient to expect that rational agents end up
behaving as prescribed by the solution concept he proposed for noncooperative
situations of strategic interaction:
By using the principles that a rational prediction should be unique,
that the players should be able to deduce and make use of it, and
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that such knowledge on the part of each player of what to expect the
others to do should not lead him to act out of conformity with the
prediction, one is led to the concept of a solution dened before.
His reasoning is not a conclusive argument by which one should expect that
the Nashsolution concept can be considered the reasonable prediction of play-
ersbehavior only in a non-cooperative game with exactly one Nash equilibrium.
Indeed, John Nash himself maintained later on in his thesis that in some classes
of noncooperative games some subsolutions can shrink the set of reasonable pre-
dictions to a singleton; besides, he o¤ered also a mass-action interpretation of
his solution concept for which solution multiplicity is not a problem. Nonethe-
less, the quotation well enlightens about the historical importance of the issue of
Nash equilibrium uniqueness in (non-cooperative) game-theoretic thought. The
present paper is devoted to analyze such issue.
On Nash equilibrium uniqueness in the class of games under examination
Many games are known to possess a multiplicity of equilibria and one cannot
hope to derive general conditions for the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium.
Thus, in this work we shall restrict attention to a particular class of games: the
class of nice games1 with isotone best reply functions.
The isotonicityof best reply correspondences, in some loose sense, is a very
general expression of the strategic complementarity among optimal choices of
agents. Games with isotonebest reply correspondences have received special
attention in the economic and game-theoretic literature because of the richness
and easy intelligibility of their equilibrium structure and properties. Such a
literature, started from [32] and [33], had been popularized in economics by
several articles during the 1990s: [21], [35], [23] and [22] just to mention a few.
Some of these articles showed interesting properties implied by Nash equilibrium
uniqueness in classes of games admitting isotone selections from best replies. For
example, in some of such classes Nash equilibrium uniqueness was proved to be:
equivalent to dominance solvability (see Theorem 5 and the second Corollary at
p. 1266 in [21], Theorem 12 in [23] and Proposition 4 in [1]); su¢ cient to estab-
lish an equivalence between the convergence to Nash equilibrium of an arbitrary
sequence of joint strategies and its consistency with adaptive learning processes
(see the rst Corollary at p. 1270 in [21] and Theorem 14 in [23]); su¢ cient
to infer the existence and uniqueness of coalition-proof Nash equilibria (see
Theorem A1 and the last Remark at p.127 in [22]). However, these articles do
not provide su¢ cient structural conditions for Nash equilibrium uniqueness.
A new strand of the literature on nice games with isotone best replies played
on networks started a still partial investigation about the conditions on utility
functions for the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium in that class of games:
1 I.e., games with a nite set of players whose strategy space is a closed proper real interval
with a minimum and whose utility function is strictly pseudoconcave and upper semicontinu-
ous in own strategy. The term nice game is introduced in [24] and our denition is similar but
not identical to the one therein.
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[3], [2], [16] and [13] to mention a few. Except for [16],2 in such papers Nash equi-
librium uniqueness is guaranteed by a type of xpoint argument introduced
by [19] in the economic literature whose application requires the isotonicity
of best reply functions.3 However, the general structures of the primitives of a
game with isotone best replies ensuring the existence of a unique Nash equilib-
rium are still unclear, despite a natural interest of economic and game theorists
in the understanding thereof; in particular, the possible role played by the iso-
tonicity of best replies is unclear. Of course, the literature o¤ers conditions on
the primitives of a game for the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium, but not
many results seem to crucially depend on the condition of isotonicity of best
replies. Restricting attention to nice games with isotone best reply functions,
can we add something to known Nash equilibrium uniqueness results?
Our contribution
We examine the conditions on the primitives of a nice game with isotone
best replies that ensure Nash equilibrium uniqueness. The investigation makes
use of a xpoint argument similar but not identical to the one in [19] which
employes a notion of generalized concavity that we name chain-concavity (see
Sect. 3 for the denition). A particular version of the argument goes as follows.
Let f be a self-map of [0; 1]n with no xpoints on the boundary of
Rn+ (e.g., each fi could be positive). Then f has exactly one xpoint
if each component function fi is isotone and chain-concave.
We derive four theorems on Nash equilibrium uniqueness in nice games. Such
theorems dispense with any di¤erentiability assumption. In case of compact
nice games with di¤erentiable utility functions, a corollary of one of our main
results by which the reader might already gain an insight of our ndings can
be stated thus (see Sect. 2, 3 and 5 for all denitions).
Let   be a smooth compact nice game. Suppose each strategy set Si
has minimum 0. Then   has exactly one Nash equilibrium if, for
each player i, the marginal utility function Mi:
 is quasiincreasing in every argument other than the i-th one;
 has a chain-convex upper level set at height zero;
 is positive at (0; : : : ; 0).
Our main Nash equilibrium uniqueness results do not rely on the di¤erentia-
bility of utility functions and are formulated in terms of Dini derivatives (here
regarded as generalized marginal utilities). The prime contribution of these
results is not, however, the lack of any di¤erentiability assumption: it will be
2Equilibrium uniqueness in [16] follows from Theorem 5.1 in [18].
3An alternative argument, still relying on the isotonicity of best replies, is provided in [3].
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shown that three classical theorems on Nash equilibrium uniqueness (i.e., [29]s
Theorem 2, [18]s Theorem 5.1 and [10]s Theorem 4.1) do not directly imply
our results even when utility functions are innitely many times di¤erentiable.
Our investigation proceeds as follows. First, we interpret the mentioned x-
point uniqueness argument as a set of su¢ cient conditions on the best replies
of a compact nice game that guarantee Nash equilibrium uniqueness. Then we
characterize these conditions in terms of generalized marginal utilities. This
characterization is carried out through the examination of the necessity and
su¢ ciency of the conditions of a Choice Problem for the isotonicity and chain-
concavity of its Choice function: this examination is our key contribution. A
Choice Problem is in the terminology of [26] and [20] a Type A problem of
comparative statics where a parametrized (strictly pseudoconcave upper semi-
continuous) function is optimized on a xed choice set (a compact proper real
interval) for each given value of the parameter; its Choice function associates
with each value of the parameter the optimal solution of the Choice Problem.
Sect. 4 and Appendix B provide new results in terms of the necessity and
su¢ ciency of the conditions for both the concavity/chain-concavity and iso-
tonicity of Choice functions. To the best of our knowledge, the concavity/chain-
concavity of optimal solutions has not been systematically studied in the litera-
ture, but results that guarantee the concavity or the chain-concavity of Choice
functions are useful also for game-theoretic analyses of problems not related to
Nash equilibrium uniqueness4 . To the contrary, the isotonicity of Choice func-
tions has been extensively investigated. However, our results on this issue do
not follow from known theorems such as [23]s Monotonicity Theorem or similar
results of the subsequent literature: for example, those in [30], [9], [1] and
though in a more abstract spirit in [20]. In fact our results on the isotonicity
of Choice functions are structurally similar to Theorem 1 in [28] and hold for
a class of problems which is properly included in that for which Theorem 1
in [28] guarantee the isotonicity of Choice functions; nevertheless, as shown in
Appendix D, the conditions involved in our di¤erential characterization di¤er
from the su¢ cient conditions on derivatives obtained in Sect. 2.4 in [28].
Structure of the paper
The paper is organized as follows: Sect. 2 presents preliminaries; Sect. 3
exposits novel notions of generalized convexity/concavity; Sect. 4 introduces
the denition of a (Normalized) Choice function for a Choice Problem and
examines the necessity and su¢ ciency of the conditions of a Choice Problem for
the isotonicity and chain-concavity of the Choice function and the positivity of
the Normalized Choice function; Sect. 5 illustrates the main Nash equilibrium
uniqueness results of this work and relates them to some known theorems of the
literature; Sect. 6 shows an extension of one of our uniqueness results to games
of incomplete information. Appendices AF show a xpoint argument, examine
the concavity of Choice functions and contain other mathematical facts.
4E.g., [5] and [6] use this type of results in the analysis of multi-leader multi-follower games.
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2 Preliminary notation, denitions and results
2.1 Notation
Let I be a proper real interval and f : I ! R. There are several standard
notations for the four Dini derivatives of f . Just to provide a precise reference,
our notation is the same of [17]: see (3.1.47) at p. 56 therein. Thus the
upper (resp. lower) right Dini derivative of f at x0 6= sup I is denoted by
D+f (x0) (resp. D+f (x0)) and the upper (resp. lower) left Dini derivative
of f at x0 6= inf I is denoted by D f (x0) (resp. D f (x0)). We recall that
D+f (x0), D+f (x0), D f (x0) and D f (x0) are well-dened elements of the
set of the extended reals R = R [ f 1;+1g.
Let f : A  B ! R, where A and B are nonempty subsets of Euclidean
spaces. Let (a; b) 2 AB. Sometimes we write f (; b) to denote the function
A! R : a 7! f (a; b) and f (a; ) to denote the function B ! R : b 7! f (a; b).
Thus, for instance, the expression f (; b) (a) is perfectly equivalent to the
expression f (a; b). This notation is standard; however, for clarity, we remark
that when (A  R and) we write D+f (; b) (a) or an analogous expression
we mean to indicate the upper right Dini derivative of f (; b) at a.
2.2 Generalized monotonicity: standard concepts
For real-valued functions, the following notions of generalized monotonicity are
standard and, for instance, can be found at p. 1199 in [12]. In our denitions,
we prefer to use the term increasinginstead of monotoneto remark the fact
that the domains are totally ordered sets.
Denition 1 A function f : X  R! R is, respectively, increasing, strictly
increasing, strictly pseudoincreasing, quasiincreasing i¤, respectively,
 (x; x) 2 X X and x < x) f (x)  f (x),
 (x; x) 2 X X and x < x) f (x) < f (x),
 (x; x) 2 X X, x < x and f (x)  0) f (x) > 0,
 (x; x) 2 X X, x < x and f (x) > 0) f (x)  0.
To dispel any doubts, the standard notion of a quasiincreasing function em-
ployed in this paper is very di¤erent from that in [19].
Denition 2 A function f : X  R! R is, respectively, decreasing, strictly
decreasing, strictly pseudodecreasing, quasidecreasing i¤  f is, respec-
tively, increasing, strictly increasing, strictly pseudoincreasing, quasiincreasing.
Henceforth, we assume the usual convention 1 0 = 0.
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Remark 1 Suppose X is a nonempty Cartesian product of m subsets of R. Let
f : X ! R, g : X ! R+ and h : X ! R++. If f is increasing (resp. strictly
increasing) in every argument then f  g (resp. f  h) is quasiincreasing (resp.
strictly pseudoincreasing) in every argument.
Table 1. Relation diagram for an extended
real-valued function f on a real interval
incr. ) quasiincr.
* *
str. incr. ) str. pseudoincr.
Denition 3 A function f : X  Rm ! R is isotone (resp. antitone) i¤
(x; x) 2 X X and xi  xi for all i = 1; : : : ;m
+
f (x)  f (x) (resp. f (x)  f (x) ).
Remark 2 Suppose X is a Cartesian product of m subsets of R then a function
f : X  Rm ! R is isotone (resp. antitone) if and only if f is increasing (resp.
decreasing) in every argument.
2.3 Generalized convexity: standard concepts
The standard denitions of a convex set X  Rm and of a real-valued (strictly)
convex function dened thereon are assumed to be known: just to provide a
precise reference, see Denitions 1.2.1 and 1.3.1 in [4]. As usual, we say that a
function f is (strictly) concave i¤ f is (strictly) convex. We shall now formally
recall some standard denitions of generalized convexity.
Denition 4 Let X  Rm be convex. Then f : X ! R is quasiconcave i¤ its
upper level sets at nite height are convex. (The upper level set at height  2 R
of f is fx 2 X : f (x)  g.)
Remark 3 Let X  Rm be convex and g : X ! R++. If f : X ! R is
quasiconcave then f  g has a convex upper level set at height 0.
We recall a characterization of a real-valued quasiconcave function (see The-
orem 2.2.3 in [4]) and a denition of a strict variant thereof.
Remark 4 Let X  Rm be convex, f : X ! R is quasiconcave if and only if
 2 ]0; 1[ , (x; x) 2 XX and x 6= x) f (x+ (1  )x)  min ff (x) ; f (x)g .
Denition 5 Let X  Rm be convex, f : X ! R is strictly quasiconcave i¤
 2 ]0; 1[ , (x; x) 2 XX and x 6= x) f (x+ (1  )x) > min ff (x) ; f (x)g .
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Remark 5 Let X  Rm be convex and f : X ! R.
(i) If f is strictly concave then f is concave;
(ii) If f is concave then f is quasiconcave;
(iii) If f is strictly quasiconcave then f is quasiconcave.
Our denition of strict pseudoconcavity in terms of Dini derivatives is due
to [8]: see Denition 9 therein. On the history of the concept see Sect. 1 in [14]
and see also Denition 2 in [15] for recent further generalizations.
Denition 6 Let X  R be convex. Then f : X ! R is strictly pseudocon-
cave i¤
(x; x) 2 X X, x < x and f (x)  f (x)) D+f (x) > 0
and
(x; x) 2 X X, x < x and f (x)  f (x)) D f (x) < 0;
f : X ! R is strictly pseudoconvex i¤  f is strictly pseudoconcave.
Remark 6 recalls some known facts: part (i) follows from part (ii) of Theorem
14 in [8]; part (ii) follows from the denition of strict pseudoconcavity; part (iii)
follows from Corollary 20 in [8].
Remark 6 Let X  R be convex and f : X ! R.
(i) If f is strictly concave then f is strictly pseudoconcave;
(ii) If f is strictly pseudoconcave then f has at most one maximizer;
(iii) If f strictly pseudoconcave and upper semicontinuous then f is strictly
quasiconcave.
Examples of real-valued strictly pseudoconcave functions on R which are nei-
ther quasiconcave nor upper semicontinuous can be constructed by the reader.
Table 2. Relation diagram for an upper semicontinuous
real-valued function f on a real interval
conc. ) quasiconc.
* *
str. conc. ) str. pseudoconc. ) str. quasiconc.
Finally, a characterization of strictly pseudoconcave functions is recalled: for
a proof see, e.g., Theorem 1 at p. 1199 in [12] and references therein.
Remark 7 A real-valued di¤erentiable function f on an open proper real in-
terval is strictly pseudoconcave if and only if Df is strictly pseudodecreasing.
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3 Generalized convexity: chain-convexity
We now introduce some notions of generalized convexity: to the best of our
knowledge all denitions and results of this Sect. 3 are new.
Denition 7 A subset X of Rm is said to be chain-convex i¤
 2 [0; 1] , (x; x) 2 XX and xi  xi for all i = 1; :::;m ) x+(1  )x 2 X.
Fig 1. A chain-convex set Fig 2. A chain-convex set
Remark 8 Let X  Rm. If X is convex then X is chain-convex. When m = 1
the converse is true but is generally false when m > 1.
Denition 8 Let X  Rm be chain-convex. A function f : X ! R is said to
be chain-concave i¤
 2 [0; 1] , (x; x) 2 X X and xi  xi for all i = 1; :::;m
+
f (x) + (1  ) f (x)  f (x+ (1  )x) .
A function f : X ! R is said to be chain-convex i¤  f is chain-concave.
Remark 9 If g and h are chain-concave real-valued functions on a chain-convex
subset X of Rm then so is g + h. Also, when X  Rm is convex, a concave
function f : X ! R is chain-concave; the converse is true when m = 1 but is
generally false when m > 1 (examples of chain-concave functions with convex
domains that are not concave are shown after Remark 11). Clearly, every real-
valued function on a disconnected antichain in R2 e.g., on a set like the one
in Fig. 1 is chain-concave but not concave.
We preliminarily recall a fact used in the proof of Lemma 1.
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Remark 10 Let IX  R be a proper interval and IY  R be an open superset
of IX . Suppose g : IY ! R is twice continuously di¤erentiable. A necessary
and su¢ cient condition for the concavity of g on IX i.e., for the concavity of
gjIX is that D2g (t)  0 for all t 2 IX .
Denition 9 An mm matrix H is conegative i¤ vT H v  0 for all v 2 Rm+ .
Lemma 1 Let Y  Rm be open and nonempty and f : Y ! R be twice con-
tinuously di¤erentiable. Let X be a chain-convex subset of Y . Then f is chain-
concave on X if the Hessian matrix
H (x) =

@2f
@xi@xl
(x)

i;l
is conegative at all x 2 X.
Proof. If X = ; we are done. Assume that X 6= ;. By contradiction, suppose
that H (x) is conegative at all x 2 X and f is not chain-concave. Then there
exist  2 [0; 1] and (z; z) 2 X X such that zi  zi for all i = 1; :::;m and that
f (z + (1  ) z) < f (z) + (1  ) f (z). Thus z 6= z and  2 ]0; 1[. Put
v = z   z, IX = ft 2 R : (z + tv) 2 Xg and IY = ft 2 R : (z + tv) 2 Y g .
Note that [0; 1]  IX  IY  R, that IX is an interval and that IY is open. Let
' : IY ! R : t 7! f (z + tv) .
As ' (0) = f (x), ' (1) = f (z) and ' (1  ) = f (z + (1  ) z), we have that
' (1  ) < ' (0) + (1  )' (1) .
Thus ' is twice continuously di¤erentiable on IX but not concave on IX . Thus
D2' (t) > 0 for some t 2 IX . But this is impossible as
D2' (t) = vT H (z + tv)  v for all t 2 IX
by the twice continuous di¤erentiability of f and
vT H (z + tv)  v  0 for all t 2 IX
by the conegativity of H (z + tv) for all t 2 IX .
A nonpositive mm matrix is conegative, and Corollary 1 readily follows.
Corollary 1 Under the conditions of Lemma 1, f is chain-concave on X if
H (x) is nonpositive at all x 2 X (i.e., if
@2f
@xi@xl
(x)  0
for all i = 1; : : : ;m, all l = 1; : : : ;m and all x 2 X).
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A characterization of chain-concave functions is provided.
Theorem 1 Let X  Rm be nonempty, open and chain-convex and f : X ! R
be twice continuously di¤erentiable. Then f is chain-concave if and only if the
Hessian matrix
H (x) =

@2f
@xi@xl
(x)

i;l
is conegative at all x 2 X.
Proof. The if part follows from Lemma 1. We prove the only if part. By
contradiction, assume that f is chain-concave and H (z) is not conegative for
some z 2 X. Then there exists v 2 Rm+n f0g such that vT  H (z)  v > 0. As
X is open, there exists  2 R++ and z 2 X such that v =  (z   z). Thus
( (z   z))T H (z)  ( (z   z)) > 0 and hence
(z   z)T H (z)  (z   z) > 0. (1)
As f is chain-concave, the function
' : I ! R : t 7! f (z + t (z   z)) with I = ft 2 R : z + t (z   z) 2 Xg
must be concave. Note that I is open and includes [0; 1]. Thus D2' (0)  0, in
contradiction with (1) and the fact that D2' (0) = (z   z)T H (z)  (z   z).
Remark 11 In Theorem 1, a necessary and su¢ cient condition for the coneg-
ativity of H (x) is the semimonotonicity of  H (x): see Denition 3.9.1 and
Proposition 3.9.8 in [7]. Clearly, a su¢ cient condition for the conegativity of
H (x) is the negative semideniteness5 of H (x). Also, a su¢ cient condition for
the negative semideniteness of H (x) is that H (x) is a diagonally dominant
matrix with nonpositive diagonal entries: see Denition 2.2.19 and part (c) of
Proposition 2.2.20, in [7]. All these su¢ cient conditions can be used to check the
conegativity of H (x); however, for the examples of this article, the nonpositivity
condition mentioned in Corollary 1 remains the easiest-to-checkcondition.
We clarify further the relation between chain-concavity and (quasi)concavity:
 f : R2 ! R : (x1; x2) 7!  x1x2 is chain-concave but not concave (nor
quasiconcave or isotone or antitone);
 f : [0; 1]2 ! [ 1; 0] : (x1; x2) 7!  x1x2 is antitone and chain-concave but
not concave (nor quasiconcave);
 f : [0; 1]4 ! [0; 1] : (x1; x2; x3; x4) 7! x1 + x2   x1x2 is isotone and chain-
concave but not concave (nor quasiconcave);
 f : R2+ ! R+ : (x1; x2) 7! x1 + x2   e (x1+1)(x2+1) + e 1 is isotone, Lip-
schitz continuous and chain-concave but not concave (nor quasiconcave).
5 I.e., a su¢ cient condition is that vT H (x)  v  0 for all v 2 Rm.
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Changing the sign of the four functions above, one easily obtains examples
of chain-convex functions which are not convex. For instance, the function
 f : [0; 1]2 ! [0; 1] : (x1; x2) 7! x1x2 is isotone and chain-convex but not
convex.
Alternatively, one can consider variants of the second and fourth examples
above to construct nonnegative chain-convex functions which are not convex.
For instance, the nonnegative function
 f : R2+ ! R+ : (x1; x2) 7! x1 + x2 + e (x1+1)(x2+1)   e 1 is chain-convex,
isotone and Lipschitz continuous but not convex.
Proposition 1 adapts to chain-concavity/convexity well-known results of con-
vex analysis. Part (i) of Proposition 1 can be considerably generalized and is
conveniently stated here for future reference.
Proposition 1 Let X  Rm and Y  R be chain-convex sets. Let f : Y ! R
be isotone and let g : X ! R. Suppose g [X]  Y and put h = f  g.
(i) If g is isotone then h is isotone.
(ii) If g is chain-convex and f is chain-convex then h is chain-convex.
(iii) If g is chain-concave and f is chain-concave then h is chain-concave.
Proof. The proof of (i) is trivial and hence is omitted. The proof of (ii) is
as follows. Suppose g is chain-convex. Choose an arbitrary  2 [0; 1] and an
arbitrary pair (x; z) 2 X X such that xi  zi for all i = 1; : : : ;m. Then
g (y)  g (x) + (1  ) g (z) with y = x+ (1  ) z.
Thus f (g (y))  f (g (x) + (1  ) g (z)) by the isotonicity of f . Suppose f
is chain-convex. Then f is convex as Y  R. By the convexity of f the last
inequality becomes f (g (y))  f (g (x)) + (1  ) f (g (z)). We conclude that
h (y)  h (x)+(1  )h (z) and thus that h is chain-convex by the arbitrariness
of  and (x; z). The proof of (iii) is analogous to the proof of (ii).
Denition 10 A function f : X ! R on a chain-convex subset X of Rm is
chain-quasiconcave i¤ its upper level sets at nite height are chain-convex.
The following conclusions can be easily derived by the reader.
Remark 12 Let X  Rm be chain-convex and f : X ! R.
(i) If f is either isotone or antitone then f is chain-quasiconcave;
(ii) If X is convex and f is quasiconcave then f is chain-quasiconcave;
(iii) If f is real-valued and chain-concave then f is chain-quasiconcave;
(iv) If g : X ! R++ and f is chain-quasiconcave then f  g has a chain-convex
upper level set at height 0.
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4 On three properties of a C-function
We make use of the following denition of a Choice Problem.
Denition 11 By a Choice Problem (CP in short) we mean a triple (A;B; f)
where: (i) A is a compact proper real interval; (ii) B is a nonempty subset of
Rm with m 2 N; (iii) f is a function from A  B into R such that f (; b) is
strictly pseudoconcave and upper semicontinuous for all b 2 B.
Notation (Df) With each CP we associate the function
Df : int (A)B ! R : (a; b) 7! D f (; b) (a) .
We now dene a Choice function for a CP and a normalization thereof.
These two functions are used in this Sect. 4 when analyzing the change of
optimal choices in a parameter. It is perhaps worth mentioning that, given a
CP and b 2 B, the set arg max f (; b) is nonempty as A is a compact proper
real interval and f (; b) is upper semicontinuous and hence contains exactly
one element as f (; b) is strictly pseudoconcave (see Remark 6).
Denition 12 Given a CP, by the Choice function (C-function in short)
associated to such a CP we mean the function
 : B ! A such that f (b)g = arg max f (; b) at all b 2 B
and by the Normalized Choice function (NC-function in short) associated
to such a CP we mean the function  : B ! R+ : b 7!  (b) minA.
We now examine the necessity and su¢ ciency of the conditions for the iso-
tonicity and chain-concavity of a C-function and for the positivity of an NC-
function. We refer to Appendix B for an examination of the necessity and
su¢ ciency of the conditions for the concavity of a C-function.
4.1 Isotonicity of a C-function
The following Theorem 2 is the rst main result of this Sect. 4. We refer to
Appendix D for a comparison with related results of the literature.
Theorem 2 Consider a CP and the associated function . Suppose B is the
Cartesian product of m subsets of R. Then,  is isotone if and only if Df (a; )
is quasiincreasing in every argument6 for all a 2 int (A).
Proof. If part. Suppose Df (a; ) is quasiincreasing in every argument for all
a 2 int (A). Pick (x; y) 2 B B such that x 6= y and xl  yl for all l = 1; :::;m.
6Recall that Df (a; ) :
Qm
i=1Bi ! R. Thus the quasiincreasingness of Df (a; ) in every
argument is somehow incorrectly the quasiincreasingness of Df
 
a; (xl)
m
l=1

in every xl.
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It su¢ ces to show that  (x)   (y). If  (x) = minA then  (x)   (y).
Suppose  (x) > minA. By the strict pseudoconcavity of f (; x),
D+f (; x) (a) > 0 for all a 2 [minA;  (x)[ .
Thus, by part (ii) of Theorem 1.13 in [11],
Df (a; x) = D f (; x) (a)  0 for all a 2 ]minA;  (x)[
and hence, by Lemma C1 in Appendix C,
Df (a; y) = D f (; y) (a)  0 for all a 2 ]minA;  (x)[
because Df (a; ) is quasiincreasing in every argument. Hence  (x)   (y):
otherwise  (y) <  (x) and D f (; y) (a)  0 for some a 2 ] (y) ;  (x)[ in
contradiction with the strict pseudoconcavity of f (; y).
Only if part. Assume that  is isotone and, by contradiction, suppose that
Df (a; ) is not quasiincreasing in the j-th argument for some a 2 int (A). Then
there exist a 2 int (A), x 2 B and y 2 B such that xj < yj , xl = yl for all
l = f1; :::;mg n fjg and
D f (; x) (a) > 0 > D f (; y) (a) .
By part (iii) of Remark 6 and Corollary 2.5.2 in [4], f (; x) is strictly decreasing
on [ (x) ;maxA] and f (; y) is strictly increasing on [minA;  (y)]. Hence
a 2 A and a >  (x) ) D f (; x) (a)  0
and
a 2 A and minA < a   (y) ) D f (; y) (a)  0.
We conclude that a   (x) and a >  (y), which implies  (y) <  (y) in
contradiction with the isotonicity of .
4.2 Positivity of an NC-function
Our results on the chain-concavity of the C-function  will be established on
the subset of B where  is greater than minA: such a subset coincides with the
support of the NC-function  (i.e., the set of points where  does not vanish).
Clearly, the support of  is B if and only if  is positive. Some simple facts
about the necessity and su¢ ciency of the conditions for B to coincide with the
support of  are provided by the following Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 Consider a CP and the associated functions  and . Suppose
B has a least element, say !. Besides assume that  is isotone. The support of
 is B (or equivalently,  is positive) if and only if D+f (; !) (minA) > 0.
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Proof. First note that the isotonicity of  is equivalent to the isotonicity of .
If part. Suppose D+f (; !) (minA) > 0. Then  (!) > 0 and ! is in the
support of . The isotonicity of  implies that the support of  is B.
Only if part. Suppose the support of  is B. If D+f (; !) (minA)  0.
Then f (; !) (minA) > f (; !) (x) for all x > minA by the denition of a
strictly pseudoconcave function. Hence !, which is an element of B, would not
be in the support of : a contradiction.
4.3 Chain-concavity of a C-function
Theorem 3 is the second main result of this Sect. 4.
Theorem 3 Consider a CP and the associated functions  and . Suppose B
is chain-convex. Besides assume that  is isotone and  is positive. Then  is
chain-concave if and only if Df has a chain-convex upper level set at height 0.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we shall put minA = 0. Thus  equals the
NC-function .
If part. Assume that Df has a chain-convex upper level set at height 0.
Suppose that x and z are elements of B such that xi  zi for all i = 1; :::;m
and put
 :=  (x) and  :=  (z) .
By the isotonicity of the positive function ,
0 = minA <   .
Pick  2 ]0; 1[ and put y := x+ (1  ) z. We are done if we prove that
 :=  + (1  )    (y) =: .
Case min f; g < maxA. In this case  = min f; g < maxA. Suppose, to
the contrary, that  < . Note that
D f (; y) () < 0 (2)
because f (; y) is a strictly pseudoconcave function maximized at , with
minA   <  < maxA.
Since  and  are respectively maximizers of f (; x) and of f (; z),
D f (; x) ()  0  D f (; z) ()
and hence
min fDf (; x) ;Df (; z)g  0 .
Thus (; x) and (; z) belong to the upper level set at height 0 of Df , and hence
so does7 also (; y) by the chain-convexity of the upper level set at height 0 of
Df . Therefore
Df (; y) = D f (; y) ()  0,
7Recall and this is important here that xi  zi for all i = 1; :::;m and that   .
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in contradiction with (2).
Case min f; g  maxA. Thus  =  = maxA. By the strict pseudocon-
cavity of f (; x) and f (; z),
D+f (; x) (a) > 0 < D+f (; z) (a) for all a 2 int (A) [ fminAg .
By part (ii) of Theorem 1.13 in [11], f (; x) and f (; z) are increasing on int (A);
consequently,
Df (a; x) = D f (; x) (a)  0  D f (; z) (a) = Df (a; z) for all a 2 int (A)
and hence
Df (a; y) = D f (; y) (a)  0 for all a 2 int (A)
by the chain-convexity of the upper level set at height 0 of Df . Thus we
must have  =  (y) = maxA = : otherwise  (y) 2 int (A) [ fminAg and
D f (; y) (a)  0 for some a 2 ] (y) ;maxA[ in contradiction with the strict
pseudoconcavity of f (; y).
Only if part. Assume that  is chain-concave. By contradiction, suppose
the upper level set at height 0 of Df is not chain-convex. Then there exist
(a^; x) 2 int (A)B, (a; z) 2 int (A)B and  2 ]0; 1[ such that
a^  a and xl  zl for all l = 1; :::;m,
D f (; x) (a^)  0  D f(; z) (a) , (3)
and
D f(; x+ (1  ) z) (a^+ (1  ) a) < 0. (4)
By the strict pseudoconcavity of f (; x) and f(; z), (3) implies
 (x)  a^ and (z)  a.
Thus  (x)  a^ and (1  )(z)  (1  ) a, and hence
a^+ (1  ) a   (x) + (1  )(z).
By part (iii) of Remark 6 and Corollary 2.5.2 in [4] reasoning as in the proof
of the only if part of Theorem 2 we have that
(x+ (1  ) z) < a^+ (1  ) a
since f(; x + (1  ) z) is upper semicontinuous and strictly pseudoconcave
and (4) holds true. But then
(x+ (1  ) z) <  (x) + (1  )(z),
in contradiction with the chain-concavity of .
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5 Uniqueness of Nash equilibria
By a game   we mean a triple
 
N; (Si)i2N ; (ui)i2N

where N = f1; :::; ng is the
set of players (thus we are tacitly assuming also that N is nite and n > 1),
Si 6= ; is player is strategy set and ui :
Q
i2N Si ! R is player is utility
function. We denote by S the joint strategy set
Q
i2N Si and by S i the
joint strategy set of is opponents
Q
l2Nnfig Sl. Sometimes, an element of
S i is denoted by s i and we write (si; s i) instead of s.
Denition 13 We say that a game   is a nice game if, for all i 2 N :
 Si is a proper closed real interval with a minimum;
 ui is upper semicontinuous in the i-th argument;
 ui is strictly pseudoconcave in the i-th argument.
Denition 14 A nice game   is a compact nice game if each Si is compact.
A nice game   is an unbounded nice game if each Si is upper unbounded.
Notation (!,) The least joint strategy (minSi)i2N of a nice game is denoted
by ! and the greatest joint strategy (maxSi)i2N of a compact nice game by .
Notation (Dui  ,D+ui) Given a nice game   and i 2 N , we denote
 player is lower left marginal utility function by
Dui  : int (Si) S i ! R : (si; s i) 7! D ui (; s i) (si) ,
 player is upper right marginal utility function by
D+ui : int (Si) S i ! R : (si; s i) 7! D+ui (; s i) (si) .
Notation (Dui  ,D+ui) Given a nice game   and i 2 N , we denote
 player is extended lower left marginal utility function by
Dui  : (Sin finf Sig) S i ! R : (si; s i) 7! D ui (; s i) (si) ,
 player is extended upper right marginal utility function by
D+ui : (Sin fsupSig) S i ! R : (si; s i) 7! D+ui (; s i) (si) .
The denition of a smooth game used in the Introduction is the following.
(Note that, despite our terminology, a players smooth utility function can
well be discontinuous in the opponentsstrategies.)
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Denition 15 Let   be a nice game. We say that   is a smooth nice game
if ui (; s i) has a di¤erentiable extension vi (; s i) to some open superset of Si,
for all s i 2 S i and for all i 2 N . Given a smooth nice game   and chosen
a di¤erentiable extension vi (; s i) of ui (; s i) for each i 2 N and for each
s i 2 S i, the function
Mi : S ! R : s 7! @vi
@si
(s)
is called player is marginal utility function.
As usual, a (pure strategy)Nash equilibrium is a xpoint of the set-valued
joint best reply function
b : S !Qi2N 2Si : s 7! (arg maxui (; s i))i2N ,
that is, e is a Nash equilibrium for   if and only if ei 2 bi (e) for all i 2 N . When
player is best reply function bi is single-valued, such bi can be understood
as a function into Si: this observation will be often used without further mention
in the sequel of Sect. 5.
Remark 13 In any nice game player is best reply bi can be understood as a
partial function bi : S 9 Si dened by fbi (s)g = arg maxui (; s i) whenever
arg maxui (; s i) 6= ;: recall that in any nice game arg maxui (; s i) is either a
singleton or the empty set (see Remark 6). Thus, when bi is nonempty-valued
like, e.g., in compact nice games such partial function is indeed a function
bi : S ! Si dened by fbi (s)g = arg maxui (; s i).
5.1 A characterization theorem
Corollaries A1 and A2 in Appendix A state two xpoint uniqueness results for
a self-map of a nite Cartesian product of compact proper real intervals; but
as a matter of fact, the two Corollaries provide also su¢ cient conditions on the
joint best reply function of a compact nice game for the existence of exactly one
Nash equilibrium. In Sect. 4 we have characterized such conditions in terms of
generalized marginal utilities; Theorem 4 and its Corollary 2 readily follow
from these characterizations.
Theorem 4 Let   be a compact nice game and i 2 N . The best reply function
bi is (i) isotone, (ii) chain-concave and (iii) greater than !i if and only if:
H1. Dui  is quasiincreasing in the j-th argument, for all j 2 Nn fig;
H2. Dui  has a chain-convex upper level set at height 0;
H3. D+ui is positive at the least joint strategy !.
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Proof. Let (A;B; f) be the CP where A = Si, B = S i and f is dened by
f (si; s i) = ui (si; s i). Pick an arbitrary x 2 Si and note that the function
 : S i ! Si : s i 7! bi (x; s i) is the C-function for (A;B; f). Note also that
 is isotone (resp. chain-concave, greater than !i) if and only if so is bi.
If part. Suppose H13 hold. As H1 holds,  is isotone by Theorem 2; thus
bi is isotone. As  is isotone and H3 holds,  is greater than !i by Proposition
2; thus bi is greater than !i. As  is isotone and greater than !i and H2 holds,
 is chain-concave by Theorem 3; thus bi is chain-concave.
Only if part. Suppose bi is isotone, chain-concave and greater than !i; then
so is also . As  is isotone, H1 holds by Theorem 2. As  is isotone and greater
than !i, H3 holds by Proposition 2. As  is isotone, chain-concave and greater
than !i then H2 holds by Theorem 3.
Corollary 2 is only a dualreformulation of Theorem 4.
Corollary 2 Let   be a compact nice game and i 2 N . The best reply function
bi is (i) isotone, (ii) chain-convex and (iii) smaller than i if and only if:
H1. D+ui is quasiincreasing in the j-th argument, for all j 2 Nn fig;
H2. D+ui has a chain-convex lower level set at height 0;
H3. Dui  is negative at the greatest joint strategy .
Proof. To prove the thesis for   =
 
N; (Sl)l2N ; (ul)l2N

, it su¢ ces to consider
the game
 
N; ( Sl)l2N ; (ul  (  id S))

and apply Theorem 4.
Theorem 5 is worth to be stated separately: its proof follows the same
reasoning of that of Theorem 4 and is omitted.
Theorem 5 Let   be a compact nice game and i 2 N . The best reply function
bi is isotone if and only if H1 is satised for i.
Example 1 shows compact nice games where H1 is satised for all players.
Example 1 Put X = [0; 1] and let   be a multiplayer game where, for all i 2 N ,
Si = X and ui (s) = g (s i)  di (si; f (s i))
for some function gi : S i ! R, some isotone function fi : S i ! X and some
premetric8 di : R R! R which is lower semicontinuous in the rst argument
and strictly pseudoconvex in the rst argument: e.g., letting   0,   0 and
 > 0, we might have that
di (x; y) =  jx  yj+ R (x  y) + yR (x  y)
or that
di (x; y) = jx  yj + H (x  y) + yR (x  y)
8A premetric di : R R! R is a nonnegative function such that di (x; x) = 0 for all x 2 R.
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(where R denotes the so-called ramp function R : R ! R dened by R (z) =
max (0; z) and H denotes the so-called Heavyside step function H : R ! R
dened by H (z) = 0 if z  0 and by H (z) = 1 if z > 0).
In the statement of Theorem 5 one can replace H1 with H1: this would be
only an equivalent reformulation. Also, by reversing the order of the parameter
set of the CP considered in Theorem 2, one readily obtains a necessary and
su¢ cient condition9 for the antitonicity of best replies in compact nice games:
such a result, however, is only another reformulation of Theorem 5 and hence
we omit it. The following consequence of Tarskis xpoint theorem is recalled.
Remark 14 Let   be a compact nice game where H1 is satised for all players.
Then a greatest Nash equilibrium and a least Nash equilibrium exist.
5.2 Bounded strategy sets
Theorem 6 readily follows from Theorem 4 and Corollary A1: we omit the proof.
Theorem 6 Let   be a compact nice game where H1, H2 and H3 are satised
for all i 2 N . Then   has exactly one Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 7 readily follows from Corollaries 2 and A2: we omit the proof.
Theorem 7 Let   be a compact nice game where H1, H2and H3are satised
for all i 2 N . Then   has exactly one Nash equilibrium.
Though evident, the following fact is explicitly remarked.
Remark 15 In Theorem 6 no i-th component of the unique Nash equilibrium
equals !i (an analogous remark holds for Theorem 8). Similarly, in Theorem 7
no i-th component of the unique Nash equilibrium equals i.
Example 2 Consider again Example 1 and additionally assume that each func-
tion fi (resp. 1  fi) is chain-concave and positive: a unique Nash equilibrium
exists as H1, H2 and H3 (resp. H1, H2and H3) are satised for all i 2 N .
5.3 Unbounded strategy sets
Theorems 89 extend Theorems 67 to the case of upper unbounded strategy
sets: their proofs are contained in Appendix E.
Theorem 8 Let   be an unbounded nice game where H1, H2 and H3 are sat-
ised for all i 2 N . Suppose there exists s in the interior of S such that
Dui 
 
si ; s

 i

< 0, for all i 2 N . (5)
Then   has exactly one Nash equilibrium.
9Which would be the quasidecreasingness of each Dui  in the opponentsstrategies.
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We remark that Theorem 9 below is in no way a dualof Theorem 8.
Theorem 9 Let   be an unbounded nice game where H1and H2are satised
for all i 2 N . Suppose
Dui  (t; : : : ; t) < 0 for all i 2 N , for all su¢ ciently large t 2 R++. (6)
Then   has exactly one Nash equilibrium.
Example 3 Consider again Example 1. Replace the assumption X = [0; 1] with
the assumption X = R+, leaving unaltered all the other conditions. Additionally
assume that each fi is positive and chain-concave (resp. chain-convex). Finally,
assume that fi (x; : : : ; x) < x for all su¢ ciently large x, for all i 2 N . Then
Theorem 8 (resp. Theorem 9) ensure the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium.
5.4 Further examples and relation to other results
Theorems 69 can be certainly applied to games on networks: conditions H1
3 and H13are compatible with a utility function ui that is constant in the
strategy sl of some player l 6= i that does not belong to player is neighbourhood
Ni  Nn fig. It should be clear, however, that this compatibility would not
have occurred in general if, for instance, in H2 the condition Dui  has a chain-
convex upper level set at height 0had been the much stronger Dui  is strictly
concaveor in H1 the condition Dui  is quasiincreasing in the j-th argument,
for all j 2 Nn fighad been the much stronger Dui  is strictly increasing in
the j-th argument, for all j 2 Nn fig. Examples 4-5 below are conceived as
possible examples of games on networks (note that the functional formof ui
in Examples 4-5 is similar to that dened by (2) in [3]); but the structure of the
system of neighbours in the network is not important for the application of our
Nash equilibrium uniqueness results, and hence we shall not mention it.
Example 4 Let   be a game where each Si = [0; i] (with i 2 R++) and each
ui is dened by
ui : s 7! fi (i (s i)) si + isi   isii
for some isotone chain-concave function i : S i ! R+ and some concave10
function fi : R+ ! R+ and with
i > 0, i > 0 and i  2.
Then   satises all conditions of Theorem 6: each ui (; s i) is strictly concave
and continuous; each ui (; ! i) is not decreasing (hence D+ui (; ! i) (!i) > 0
by the strict concavity of ui (; ! i)); each function int (Si)  S i ! R : s 7!
D ui (; s i) (si) is increasing in every argument j 6= i and chain-concave.
10Recall that any concave function fi : R+ ! R+ is necessarily increasing. Also, recall that
Proposition 1 guarantees that fi  i : S i ! R+ is chain-concave and isotone.
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Example 5 Example 4 can be readily generalized. Let   be a game where each
Si = [0; i] (with i 2 R++) and adopting the convention 00 = 1 each ui is
dened by
ui : s 7! fi (i (s i)) sii + isi   isii
for some isotone chain-concave function i : S i ! R+ and some concave
function fi : R+ ! R+ and with i 2 [0; 1], i > 0, i > 0 and i  2. Then  
satises all conditions of Theorem 6: Appendix F proves this claim.11
Theorem 6 does not follow from Theorem 2 in [29]: Remark 16 claries.
Remark 16 Theorem 2 in [29] does not guarantee the existence of exactly one
Nash equilibrium for some games described by Example 4 (and hence, more
generally, satisfying the conditions of Theorem 6). This is evident, for instance,
if we consider the game   where N = f1; 2g, S1 = S2 = [0; 1],
u1 (s1; s2) = s1 (1 + s2)  2s31 and u2 (s1; s2) = s2 (1 + s1)  2s32.
This is the particular game described in Example 4 where N = f1; 2g and for
all i 2 N : i = 1, i = 2, i = 3, fi = idR+ and i : s i 7!
P
l2Ni sl with
Ni = Nn fig. Pick a player i 2 N of this symmetric game: the function
 : ]0; 1[! R : t 7! @ui
@si
(t; t)
is strictly increasing on ]0; 1=12[ and we can conclude that   does not satisfy
the assumptions of Theorem 2 in [29] since those assumptions would imply the
decreasingness of  (on the entire ]0; 1[).
Let us now consider an unboundedversion of Example 4.
Example 6 Consider again Example 4 and suppose each i 6= 2. Replace the
assumption that each Si is a compact proper interval with Si = R+. Now  
satises all conditions of Theorem 8. (Note that fi  i is isotone concave and
nonnegative on Lk = f(x; : : : ; x) : x  kg  Rn 1 for all k > 0, thus (fi  i) jLk
is Lipschitz continuous when k > 0 and Dui  (x; : : : ; x) < 0 for some large x > 0.)
Remark 17 claries that Theorem 8 does not follow from Theorem 5.1 in [18]
or from Theorem 4.1 in [10].
Remark 17 Reconsider the game described in Remark 16, but now put S1 =
S2 = R+. Such a modied game   is certainly compatible with the conditions of
Example 6 (and, more generally, with the conditions of our Theorem 8). Pick
a player i 2 N of this modied symmetric game  : the function
 : R++ ! R : t 7! @ui
@si
(t; t)
11Note that some condition listed at the end of Example 4 need not be satised when i 6= 1.
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is strictly increasing on ]0; 1=12[ and
@2u1
@s1@s1
(1=24; 1=24) =  1
2
< 1 =
@2u1
@s1@s2
(1=24; 1=24) .
Thus   does not satisfy the conditions of Theorem 5.1 in [18] since those condi-
tions would imply the decreasingness of  (on the entire R++); also,   does not
satisfy the conditions of Theorem 4.1 in [10] since those conditions would imply @2u1@s1@s1 (1=24; 1=24)
 >  @2u1@s1@s2 (1=24; 1=24)
 .
6 Incomplete information
Some of our equilibrium uniqueness results extend to certain incomplete infor-
mation games. Following the interim formulation of the Bayesian game in Sect.
3 of [34], we show a possible extension to Bayesian games with nite types.
Denition 16 A Bayesian game is a quintuple
G = (M; (Zl)l2M ; (Tl)l2M ; ((pl (j))2Tl)l2M ; (l)l2M )
where M = f1; :::;mg is a nite set of elements called players and for all l 2M :
 Zl is a nonempty set of elements called player ls actions;
 Tl is a nonempty nite set of elements called player ls types;
 pl (j) : T l ! [0; 1] is a probability measure12 on T l, for all  2 Tl;
 l : ZlZ lTlT l ! R associates a payo¤ to player l with each joint
action (zl; z l) in Zl  Z l and each joint type (tl; t l) 2 Tl  T l.
To avoid confusion, we clarify that m > 1 and that
T l :=
Q
k2Mnflg
Tk and Z l :=
Q
k2Mnflg
Zk.
Denition 17 A Bayesian Nash equilibrium for a Bayesian game G is an
m-tuple  = (l : Tl ! Zl)l2M of functions such that, for all l 2M ,
l () 2 arg max
P
2T l
l (;  l () ; ; )  pl ( j) for all  2 Tl
where  l () = (k (k))k2Mnflg.
12Henceforth we shall write pl ( j) instead of pl (j) (). Clearly,
P
2T l pl ( j) = 1. One
might interpret pl ( j) as the conditional probability for l that the joint type of ls opponents
is  when ls type is . However such an interpretation is not very important here.
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Denition 18 Let   =
 
N; (Si)i2N ; (ui)i2N

be a (complete information) game.
We say that   satises property P if, for all i 2 N :
 Si is a compact proper real interval with minimum !i;
 each function ui (; s i) is (i) strictly concave and (ii) continuous;
 the function ui (; ! i) is not decreasing (where ! i = (!l)l2Nnfig);
 the function int (Si)  S i ! R : s 7! D ui (; s i) (si) is (i) increasing
in every argument j 6= i and (ii) chain-concave.
If a game satises property P then D+ui (; ! i) (!i) > 0 (as ui (; ! i) is
strictly concave and not decreasing) and
D ui (; s i) (si) = D ui (; s i) (si)
whenever si 2 intSi. Noted this, one can readily verify that the use of the
Selten trickallows to infer Corollary 3 from Theorem 6: other corollaries can
be inferred from Theorems 7-9 and are left to the reader. Clearly, the use of
such a trickis allowed by our denition of a Bayesian game which is restricted
to the particular case of a nite set of players with nite sets of types.
Corollary 3 Let G be a Bayesian game where, for each joint type t 2Qi2M Ti,
the (complete information) game
 (t) =
 
M; (Zi)i2M ; (i (; ; ti; t i))i2M

satises property P. Then G has exactly one Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Using Corollary 3 one can easily specify classes of Bayesian games with
exactly one Bayesian Nash equilibrium like, for instance, in Example 7 below.
Example 7 Let G be a Bayesian game where, for all t 2 Qi2M Ti, the (com-
plete information) game
 
M; (Zi)i2M ; (i (; ; ti; t i))i2M

is specied like in
Example 4. Then G has exactly one Bayesian Nash equilibrium by Corollary 3.
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Appendix A: Fixpoint uniqueness
Theorem A1 Let I be a nite index set, fFigi2I be a family of compact
proper real intervals and f be a self-map of F =
Q
i2I Fi. Suppose that each
component function fi of f is isotone and chain-concave and that f has no
xpoints in
F x := ft 2 F : min fti  minFi : i 2 Ig = 0g .
Then f has exactly one xpoint.
Proof. Each (Fi;) is a complete lattice, where  denotes the usual partial
order relation13 on R induced on Fi. Denote by  the usual product partial
order relation on F . Also (F;) is a complete lattice. By Tarskis xpoint
theorem there exist a least xpoint for f , say y, and a greatest xpoint for f ,
say z. We are done if we prove that y = z. By contradiction, suppose y 6= z.
Note that
minFi < yi  zi for all i 2 I,
where the rst inequality holds because f has no xpoints in F x and the second
because z is the greatest xpoint for f . Let
y# := ft 2 F : t  yg and y := y#n fyg ,
and let a (fy; zg) denote the a¢ ne hull of fy; zg. The niteness of I guarantees
that a (fy; zg) \ y 6= ;.14 Pick
x 2 (a (fy; zg) \ y)
and let  2 ]0; 1[ be such that
y = x+ (1  ) z.
By Tarskis xpoint theorem (see the last equality in the statement of Theorem
1 in [31]), f (t)  t for all t 2 y. Then
xl < fl (x) for some l 2 I.
Since fl (y)  yl = fl (z)  zl = 0 < fl (x)  xl, we have
fl (y)  yl <  (fl (x)  xl) + (1  ) (fl (z)  zl) ;
hence, since yl = xl + (1  ) zl, we have
fl (y) < fl (x) + (1  ) fl (z) .
But the last strict inequality contradicts the chain-concavity of fl.
For clarity, when we shall write that fi is greater than !i and that fi
is smaller than iin the statements of Corollaries A12 we shall respectively
mean that fi (x) > !i for all x 2 Fand that fi (x) < i for all x 2 F.
13The lack of an index for  (i.e., the fact that we write  instead of the more correct i)
should not be a source of confusion.
14 Indeed, one might reason as follows: put I+ = fi 2 I : zi   yi > 0g where I+ 6= ; and
 = min
n
yi minFi
zi yi : i 2 I
+
o
and note that  > 0 and y   
2
(z   y) 2  a (fy; zg) \ y.
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Corollary A1 Let I be a nite nonempty index set and fFigi2I be a family of
compact proper real intervals. Let f be a self-map of F =
Q
i2I Fi and denote
by ! the least element of F . Then f has exactly one xpoint if each component
function fi is (i) isotone,(ii) chain-concave and (iii) greater than !i.
Corollary A1, and a fortiori Theorem A1, cannot be directly inferred from
Theorem 3.1 in [19] for at least two reasons: in Theorem 3.1 in [19] the domain
is unbounded and f   id is strictly R-concave while in Corollary A1 the
domain is bounded and f   id need not be strictly R-concave(e.g., the self-
map of [ 2; 1]  [ 1; 1] dened by f : (x1; x2) 7! (x2; x1=2 + 1=4) satises all
conditions15 of Corollary A1 but no extension of f to RjIj can be strictly R-
concave in the precise sense of Denition 2.1 in [19] because f (1=2; 1=2)  
(1=2; 1=2) = 0 and f1 (; )   = 0 for all  2 [0; 1=2]).
The following Corollary A2 is nothing but the dual of Corollary A1: its
proof in fact consists of the reversion of the order of F .
Corollary A2 Let I be a nite nonempty index set and fFigi2I be a family of
compact proper real intervals. Let f be a self-map of F =
Q
i2I Fi and denote by
 the greatest element of F . Then f has exactly one xpoint if each component
function fi is (i) isotone, (ii) chain-convex and (iii) smaller than i.
Appendix B: Concavity of a C-function
We prove a variant of Theorem 3 about the concavity of a C-function  on the
support of the NC-function . The variant is established without preliminary
assumptions on the isotonicity of  and the positivity of . Su¢ cient conditions
for the concavity of  can be easily derived by applying Proposition B1.
Theorem B1 Consider a CP and the associated functions  and . Suppose
B is convex. Then  has convex support and  is concave thereon if and only
if Df has a convex upper level set at height 0.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we shall put minA = 0. Thus  = .
If part. Suppose the upper level set at height 0 of Df is convex. Choose x
and z in B such that
 :=  (x) > 0 <  (z) =: .
(Therefore min f; g > 0 = minA.) Pick  2 ]0; 1[ and put y := x+ (1  ) z.
We are done if we prove that
 :=  + (1  )    (y) =: .
15Alternatively, one might also consider the self-map f of F = [ 2; 1] [ 1; 2] dened by
f : (x1; x2) 7! (min fx2; 1g ; x1=2 + 1=4) ,
noting that the rst component of f   id (i.e., F ! R : (x1; x2) 7! min fx2; 1g   x1) is even
constant in the second argument on the subset [ 2; 1] [1; 2] of its domain F .
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Case min f; g < maxA. Suppose, to the contrary, that  < . Note that
D f (; y) () < 0 (7)
because f (; y) is a strictly pseudoconcave function maximized at , with
minA   <  < maxA:
Since  and  are respectively maximizers of f (; x) and of f (; z),
D f (; x) ()  0  D f (; z) ()
and hence
0  min fDf (; x) ;Df (; z)g .
Therefore (; x) and (; z) belong to the upper level set at height 0 of Df , and
then so does also (; y) by the convexity of the upper level set at height 0 of
Df . Thus
Df (; y) = D f (; y) ()  0
in contradiction with (7).
Case min f; g  maxA. In this case  =  = maxA. By the strict
pseudoconcavity of f (; x) and f (; z),
D+f (; x) (a) > 0 < D+f (; z) (a) for all a 2 fminAg [ int (A) .
By part (ii) of Theorem 1.13 in [11], f (; x) and f (; z) are increasing on int (A);
consequently,
Df (a; x) = D f (; x) (a)  0  D f (; z) (a) = Df (a; z) for all a 2 int (A)
and hence
Df (a; y) = D f (; y) (a)  0 for all a 2 int (A)
by the convexity of the upper level set at height 0 of Df . Thus  =  (y) =
maxA = : otherwise  (y) 2 fminAg [ int (A) and D f (; y) (a)  0 for some
a 2 ] (y) ;maxA[ in contradiction with the strict pseudoconcavity of f (; y).
Only if part. Suppose  has convex support and is concave thereon. By
contradiction, suppose the upper level set at height 0 of Df is not convex. Then
there exist (a^; x) 2 int (A)B, (a; z) 2 int (A)B and  2 ]0; 1[ such that
D f (; x) (a^)  0  D f(; z) (a) , (8)
and
D f(; x+ (1  ) z) (a^+ (1  ) a) < 0. (9)
By the strict pseudoconcavity of f (; x) and f(; z), (8) implies
 (x)  a^ > minA = 0 and (z)  a > minA = 0.
26
Thus  (x)  a^ and (1  )(z)  (1  ) a, and hence
a^+ (1  ) a   (x) + (1  )(z).
Note that x and z belong to the support of  which is convex and hence
so does also x + (1  ) z. By part (iii) of Remark 6 and Corollary 2.5.2 in
[4] reasoning as in the proof of the only if part of Theorem 2 we have that
 (x+ (1  ) z) < a^+ (1  ) a
since f (; x+ (1  ) z) is upper semicontinuous and strictly pseudoconcave
and (9) holds true. But then
 (x+ (1  ) z) <  (x) + (1  )(z),
in contradiction with the concavity of  on its support.
We show conditions for the support of  to coincide with B. Clearly, if the
support of  coincides with B and  is concave thereon, then  is concave.
Proposition B1 Consider a CP and the associated function . The support
of  is B if and only if D+f (; b) (minA) > 0 for all b 2 B.
Proof. If part. An immediate consequence of the denition of D+f (; b).
Only if part. Suppose the support of  is B. If D+f (; b) (minA)  0
for some b 2 B then f (; b) (minA) > f (; b) (x) for all x > minA by the the
denition of a strictly pseudoconcave function. Hence b 2 B would not be in
the support of : a contradiction.
Appendix C: An equivalence lemma
Denition 19 A function f : X  R! R is "-pseudoincreasing i¤
(x; x) 2 X X, x < x and f(x)  0) f(x)  0.
If f : X  R ! R is "-pseudoincreasing then f is quasiincreasing; however,
the converse is generally false. We now establish a particular equivalence result.
Lemma C1 Let A  R be a proper interval, B  Rm be the Cartesian product
of m nonempty subsets of R and f : A  B ! R. Suppose f (; b) is strictly
pseudoconcave and upper semicontinuous for all b 2 B. Let L = f1; :::;mg and
Df : int (A)B ! R : (a; b) 7! D f (; b) (a) .
Then assertions A1, A2 and A3 are equivalent.
A1. Df (a; ) is quasiincreasing in every argument for all a 2 int (A).
A2. Df (a; ) is "-pseudoincreasing in every argument for all a 2 int (A).
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A3. The following implication is true:
a 2 int (A) , (x; x) 2 B B, xl  xl for all l 2 L and Df (a; ) (x)  0
+ (10)
Df (a; ) (x)  0.
Proof. Proof of A1) A2. Suppose that Df (a; ) is quasiincreasing in every ar-
gument for all a 2 int (A). Then, equivalently, Df (a; ) is quasiincreasing in the
l-th argument for all l 2 L, for all a 2 int (A). Now, by contradiction, suppose
there exists i 2 L and a 2 int (A) such that Df (a; ) is not "-pseudoincreasing
in the i-th argument. Then there exists a pair (x; x) 2 B B such that
xi  xi , xl = xl for all l 2 Ln fig and Df (a; ) (x)  0 > Df (a; ) (x) .
By the quasiincreasingness of Df (a; ) in the i-th argument, we must have that
Df (a; ) (x) = 0. (11)
As Df (a; ) (x) < 0, there exists a 2 A such that a < a and f (; x) (a) >
f (; x) (a). Thus there exists a^ 2 [a; a[ that maximizes the upper semicontin-
uous (and strictly pseudoconcave) function f (; x) j[a;a]; hence
Df (; x) (a) < 0 for all a 2 ]a^; a[ (12)
by the strict pseudoconcavity of f (; x) j[a;a]. As (11) is true, the strict pseudo-
concavity of f (; x) implies that f (; x) (a^) < f (; x) (a); thus
Df (a; ) (x) = 0 < f (; x
) (a)  f (; x) (a^)
a  a^ (13)
and by part (ii) of Theorem 1.8 in [11] Remark 18 claries why part (ii) of
Theorem 1.8 in [11] can apply there exists a 2 ]a^; a[ such that
Df (; x) (a)  f (; x
) (a)  f (; x) (a^)
a  a^ > 0. (14)
Thus, by (12) and (14), Df (; x) (a) > 0 > Df (; x) (a) with a 2 ]a^; a[.
Equivalently just changing the notation we have that
Df (a; ) (x) > 0 > Df (a; ) (x) with a 2 ]a^; a[  int (A)
and hence that Df (a; ) is not quasiincreasing in the i-th argument: a contra-
diction with the assumption that Df (a; ) is quasiincreasing in the l-th argument
for all l 2 L, for all a 2 int (A).
Proof of A2) A1. SupposeDf (a; ) is "-pseudoincreasing in every argument
for all a 2 int (A). Fix an arbitrary i 2 L and an arbitrary a 2 int (A). Clearly,
Df (a; ) is "-pseudoincreasing in the i-th argument. Then, as we have in fact
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already noted just before Lemma C1, Df (a; ) is also quasiincreasing in the i-
th argument. As i is arbitrary in L and a is arbitrary in int (A), Df (a; ) is
quasiincreasing in every argument for all a 2 int (A).
Proof of A2) A3. SupposeDf (a; ) is "-pseudoincreasing in every argument
for all a 2 int (A). Then, equivalently, Df (a; ) is "-pseudoincreasing in the l-th
argument for all a 2 int (A), for all l 2 L. Now x a 2 int (A) and (x; x) 2 BB
and suppose xl  xl for all l 2 L and Df (a; ) (x)  0. Then there exists a
taxicabsequence
 
x0; : : : ; xm

in B such that x0 = x and
xl = xl 1 + (xl   xl)  1(l) for all l = 1; : : : ;m
where 1(l) 2 Rm denotes the unit vector with the l-th component equal to one.
Since Df (a; ) is "-pseudoincreasing in the l-th argument for all l 2 L, we have
Df (a; )
 
xl
  0 and l 2 f0; : : : ;m  1g ) Df (a; )  xl+1  0.
As x0 = x, xm = x and Df (a; ) (x)  0, we infer that Df (a; ) (x)  0. Thus
implication (10) is true.
Proof of A3) A2. Suppose implication (10) is true. Fix an arbitrary i 2 L
and an arbitrary a 2 int (A). Then, by (10), Df (a; ) is "-pseudoincreasing in
the i-th argument. As i is arbitrary in L and a is arbitrary in int (A), Df (a; )
is "-pseudoincreasing in every argument for all a 2 int (A).
Remark 18 Note that (13) implies that
f (; x) (t) f (; x) (a^) > f (; x
) (a)  f (; x) (a^)
a  a^ (t  a^) for some t 2 ]a^; a[ .
To check this fact, one might reason as follows. Were the previous inequality
true for no t 2 ]a^; a[, one would have that
f (t; x)  f (a^; x)  f (a; x
)  f (a^; x)
a  a^ (t  a^) for all t 2 ]a^; a[ ;
thus one would have also that
f (t; x)  f (a; x)  f (a; x
)  f (a^; x)
a  a^ (t  a^)  f (a; x
) + f (a^; x)
for all t 2 ]a^; a[ and that
f (t; x)  f (a; x)  f (a; x
)  f (a^; x)
a  a^ (t  a) < 0
for all t 2 ]a^; a[; but the previous inequality would imply that
f (t; x)  f (a; x)
t  a 
f (a; x)  f (a^; x)
a  a^ > 0
for all t 2 ]a^; a[ and hence Df (a; x) > 0, which contradicts (13).
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Appendix D: Relation to other isotonicity theorems
Theorem 4 in [23] provides su¢ cient but not necessary conditions for a CP
to possess an isotone C-function . Example 8 claries.
Example 8 Consider the CP where A = [0; 10], B = f1; 2g, f (; 1) (a) =
5   ja  5j and f (; 2) (a) = 30   5 ja  6j   3a. Theorem 2 guarantees the
isotonicity of  (note, in particular, that
Df (a; 1) =

1 if a  5
 1 if a > 5 and Df (a; 2) =

2 if a  6
 8 if a > 6
and hence that Df (a; ) is quasiincreasing in every argument for all a 2 A).
However f does not satisfy the single crossing property in (a; b) and Theorem 4
in [23] does not guarantee the isotonicity of  (note, in particular that we have
f (8; 1)  f (0; 1) > 0 > f (8; 2)  f (0; 2)).
Analogous examples can show that the if part of our Theorem 2 does not
follow from any Proposition or Theorem in [20] where at least one of the four
conditions (7a), (7b), (7c), (7d) is involved.
From Theorem 1 in [28] see also Theorem A in [27] and the discussion
before it one easily infers necessary and su¢ cient conditions for a CP to have
an isotone C-function . At the beginning of Sect. 2.4 in [28], the authors
pointed out that such conditions need not be easily checked and with Proposition
2 in [28] they provided other simple su¢ cient conditions on the derivatives of
the function involved in their maximization problem. The following Example 9
shows that Theorem 2 does not follow from Proposition 2 in [28].
Example 9 Consider the CP where A = [ 4; 4], B = f1; 2g and
f (; b) (a) =   jajb .
Theorem 2 applies and guarantees that  is increasing. For this CP there does
not exist any positive increasing function  : A! R++ such that
Df (; 2) (a)   (a) Df (; 1) (a) for almost all a 2 A,
otherwise we would have
Df (; 2) (x)
Df (; 1) (x)   (x)   ( 3) > 0 for almost all x 2 ] 3; 0[
(and Df(;2)(x)Df(;1)(x)
1
( 3)  (x)( 3)  1 for a.a. x 2 ] 3; 0[) in contradiction with
lim sup
x"0
Df (; 2) (x)
Df (; 1) (x)
1
 ( 3) = limx"0
 2x
 ( 3) = 0.
In fact, an immediate restatement of Theorem 2 can be used to check whether
an IDO relation in the sense of [28] exists in some simple classes of IDO
families where their Proposition 2 cannot be used.
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Appendix E: Proofs of Theorems 8 and 9
Proof of Theorem 8. We split the proof into two parts: existence and
uniqueness. In the rst part we construct a new game   which has a common
Nash equilibrium with   = (N; (Si)i2N ; (ui)i2N ). In the second part we prove
the existence of at most one Nash equilibrium for  .
Equilibrium existence. As usual, denote by b the joint best reply for  , but
consider it as a partial function from S into S. Put
Si = [!i; s

i ] for all i 2 N and S =
Q
i2N S

i .
As   is a nice game, (5) ensures that each bi is nonempty-valued at s; in
particular, we must have that bi (s) 2 [!i; si ] for all i 2 N . We can extend the
previous conclusion to the entire S asserting that each bijS is a function into
Si : to verify this last fact it su¢ ces to note that (5), condition H1 and Lemma
C1 in Appendix C imply16
Dui  (z) < 0 for all z 2 S such that zi = si and zl  sl for all l 2 Nn fig
and to repeat the previous reasoning for s at any such z (considering also
that bi (z) = bi (si; z i) for all si 2 Si and for any such z). Hence bjS can be
understood as a self-map on S; this fact in turn implies that bjS coincides with
the joint best reply, call it b, of the game   = (N; (Si )i2N ; (u

i )i2N ) where
ui = uijS for all i 2 N .
As bjS = b, the xpoints of b and b coincide on S; thus each Nash equilibrium
for   is also a Nash equilibrium for  . It is easily seen that   satises all
conditions of Theorem 6 and hence   has a (unique) Nash equilibrium.
Equilibrium uniqueness. Suppose there exist two distinct Nash equilibria e
and e for  . Let   = (N; (Si)i2N ; (ui)i2N ) be the game where, for all i 2 N ,
Si = [!i;max fei ; ei g+ 1]
and ui = uijS with S =
Q
l2N Sl. As fe; eg  S  S, e and e are distinct
Nash equilibria also for  . But then we have a contradiction, since   satises
all conditions of Theorem 6 and hence it has exactly one Nash equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 9. Equilibrium existence. By (6), there exists a point s
in the topological interior of S such that
Dui  (s) < 0 for all i 2 N . (15)
As already pointed out see again the discussion after Example 1 conditions
H1 and H1are equivalent (if needed, reason as in the proof of Corollary 2). Now
the proof of equilibrium existence is exactly the same proof of that of Theorem
8 above: just replace (5)with (15)and Theorem 6with Theorem 7.
16To prove the implication identify A with Si, B with S i, f with ui and Df with Dui  .
31
Equilibrium uniqueness. Suppose there exist two distinct Nash equilibria for
 , say e and e. Put
t = max fje1j ; : : : ; jenj ; je1j ; : : : ; jenjg .
Choose t > t such that Dui  (t; : : : ; t) < 0 for all i 2 N (such a point t can be
found by assumption) and put
 = (t; : : : ; t) 2 Rn++.
Thus we have
Dui  (i;  i) < 0 for all i 2 N .
Let   = (N; (Si)i2N ; (ui)i2N ) be the game where, for all i 2 N , Si = [!i; i]
and ui = uijS with S =
Q
l2N Sl. As fe; eg  S  S, e and e are distinct
Nash equilibria also for  . But   satises all conditions of Theorem 7 and hence
it cannot have two distinct Nash equilibria.
Appendix F: Proof of a claim in Example 5
We prove that the games in Example 5 satisfy all conditions of Theorem 6 when
i 2 [0; 1]. In fact, the case i = 1 has been already discussed in Example 4.
The case i = 0 is evident. Let us consider the case i 2 ]0; 1[. Note that each
ui (; s i) is continuous and strictly concave, D+ui (!) = +1 and
Dui  (s) = si 1i (ifi (i (s i)) + is1 ii   iisi ii ).
Thus each D+ui is positive at the least joint strategy ! and by virtue of Re-
marks 1 and 12 it can be inferred that each Dui  is quasiincreasing in the j-th
argument for all j 2 Nn fig and that each Dui  has a chain-convex upper level
set at height 0 because Dui  (s) is the product of the positive function
int (Si) S i ! R : s 7! si 1i
and the chain-concave function
int (Si) S i ! ifi (i (s i)) + is1 ii   iisi ii
that is increasing in the j-th argument for all j 2 Nn fig.
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